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NO AMBIGUITY LEFT BEHIND: A DISCUSSION OF THE
CLEAR STATEMENT RULE AND THE UNFUNDED MANDATES
CLAUSE OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
Andrew G. Caffrey*
INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush, who at the time was Governor of Texas, never had
any reason to doubt that he would prevail in the 2000 Iowa Republican caucuses.1 
This might explain why the ninety-minute debate in Johnston, Iowa, held prior to the
caucuses, was no more than a fairly docile discussion between then-Governor Bush
and five other candidates for the Republican nomination.2  While there was one
particularly heated exchange between Senator John McCain and the Governor, the
candidates spent most of their time reiterating their respective positions instead of
engaging one another in debate.3  Governor Bush seized the opportunity, in a non-
threatening environment with a receptive audience, to lay the foundation for what
would become the most well-known social policy of his first term, and ultimately
his presidency.4  In discussing his education policy proposals, Governor Bush stated
that his focus would be on providing for the “local control of schools.”5  He stated
that his administration would “pass power back . . . to [the] states.”6  Consequently,
a mere three days after assuming office, President George W. Bush sent a proposal
to Congress that would later become the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).7
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1 See Dan Balz & David S. Broder, Bush Wins Iowa Poll; Forbes 2nd; Quayle, Alexander
Lag As Dole Captures Third; Turnout Is a Record, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1999, at A1; Richard
L. Berke, Bush Triumphs in a Straw Poll By Iowa G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999, at A1.
2 See Richard L. Berke, McCain Leads the Way as Republican Rivals Attack Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at A18.
3 See id.; see also Thomas B. Edsall & Dan Balz, Bush Calls McCain Plan a $40 Billion
Tax Hike; Exchanges Get Testy in GOP Presidential Hopefuls’ Final Debate Before Jan. 24
Iowa Caucuses, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2000, at A10 (detailing the exchange between Senator
McCain and Governor Bush regarding tax policy).
4 The most well-known social policy proposal of President George W. Bush’s time in
office refers to his education policy proposals that resulted in the No Child Left Behind Act.
5 Sue Kirchhoff, Schools Bursting With Issues, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 22, 2000, at 113 (quoting
Governor George W. Bush).
6 Id.
7 JASON D. MYCOFF & JOSEPH A. PIKA, CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE: PRESIDEN-
TIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, 2001–2006, at 41 (2008). See generally 20 U.S.C.
1129
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The proposal itself was indicative of the rhetoric released on the campaign trail.8 
Indeed, NCLB was crafted on promises of state and local government control, followed
by accountability.9  Yet, the law would come to represent a significant departure from
the long-standing tradition of limited federal involvement, a tradition historically
adhered to by congressional conservatives.10  The bill that came out of committee in
the House lacked certain priorities that had been emphasized in the President’s original
blueprint.  Some have even suggested that these differences were material, signifi-
cant, and embodied a new policy separate and distinct from the President’s original
plan.11  However, the bill was the result of a bipartisan compromise, and not a partisan
hijacking.12  NCLB, when signed into law, was widely hailed as a significant achieve-
ment of bipartisan efforts.13
Whether the President had changed his position on federal involvement, or
whether the law had taken a detour that led to a series of unintended consequences,
remains uncertain.  In its current form, NCLB represents a framework that forces fed-
eral mandates upon states, effectively reducing the local control of public schools.14 
The law professes to provide the funding required for compliance with such man-
dates,15 yet more often than not such funding falls short.16  Accordingly, there has been
§§ 6301–7941 (2006) (codifying as amended the No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)).
8 See MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 40–42 (“Congressional Republicans had reserved
the legislative designations of S.1 and H.R.1 for the proposal, further evidence of its top
billing.”).
9 See id. at 40.
10 LEE W. ANDERSON, CONGRESS AND THE CLASSROOM: FROM THE COLD WAR TO “NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND” 159–60 (2007).
11 Some have analogized that NCLB “is to the president’s original proposal as Burger King
is to a five-star restaurant.” Erik W. Robelen, ESEA Passage Awaits a Deal On Spending,
EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 12, 2001, at 26 (quoting Chester E. Finn, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
Education under President Reagan).
12 See MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 47. The Republican contingent was not able to
attach vouchers or block grants to the bill, which had been priorities of the President’s plan.
However, Democrats were unable to receive additional funding for class-size reduction or
school construction. Id.
13 See id. at 57–58; see also PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL’S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL
EDUCATION AGENDA 130–36 (2006).
14 In removing such local control, some have suggested that the law represents “coercive
federalism.” See George F. Will, Getting Past ‘No Child,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at B7.
15 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
16 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29253, at *3–6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005), rev’d sub nom. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of
Educ., 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (plurality
opinion affirming district court); Gina Austin, Note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the
No Child Left Behind Act Usurps States’ Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 340–42
(2005) (stating that according to “some estimates, the current level of . . . funding is as much
as 11 billion dollars short of the promises made when the law was enacted”).
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litigation challenging both congressional authority and the law itself.17  The most recent
of such litigation sought to enjoin the federal government from enforcing the require-
ments of NCLB, or reducing states’ Title I funding as a result of non-compliance.18
This Note will examine the recent litigation, as well as the consequences facing
state and local governments in this new decade.  The purpose of this Note is to demon-
strate that NCLB, and specifically its unfunded mandates clause, is as unclear as it
is untenable.  As a result, courts should continue to entertain challenges and ought to
place the proverbial ball back in Congress’s court.  Part I will discuss the specifics
of NCLB, the unfunded mandates clause, and the challenges facing states in their
attempts to meet the 2014 proficiency requirement.19  Part II will look at the clear
statement analysis courts apply to check Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. 
Part III will review the recent challenges states have raised, specifically detailing the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in School District of Pontiac v. Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Education.20  Finally, Part IV will offer some recommen-
dations for reconstructing NCLB, and discuss the political feasibility of modifying
current federal education policy so as to avoid the harm that awaits state and local
governments as NCLB compliance requirements loom large.
I. THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT (NCLB)
Signed into law in January of 2002, NCLB was widely hailed as a significant
achievement at the federal level for much needed education reform.21  It passed over-
whelmingly, with Republican and Democratic support in both legislative bodies.22 
Its stated purpose was to increase the proficiency of students in underachieving school
districts, while simultaneously “provid[ing] parents with options.”23  Even though
these options would not appear unless and until a school district continuously failed
to improve, the overall reform effort was viewed as consistent with its overarching
theme of helping disadvantaged and underfunded schools, students, and parents alike.24
17 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009);
Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006); see also Sam Dillon,
Connecticut Lawsuit Is Cut Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A18.
18 See Spellings, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at *3–6; see also Mark Walsh, Federal
Appeals Court Weighs Union’s Suit Over NCLB, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 7, 2009, at 7.
19 Schools that have accepted funding under NCLB are expected to achieve one hundred
percent academic proficiency by 2014. See MANNA, supra note 13, at 128 tbl.6.1.
20 584 F.3d at 253.
21 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 130–31.
22 MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 51–52 (ultimately only forty-five House Represen-
tatives, and eight Senators voted against the respective House and Senate versions of the law).
23 Requirements of No Child Left Behind Act, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at T20 (“The
idea . . . is to ensure that no child is trapped in a poorly performing school . . . .”).
24 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006); see also MANNA, supra note 13, at 128 tbl.6.1. After two
consecutive years of failing to make the requisite progress, a school is designated as a school
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NCLB amended the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).25  It was structured to replace the failed Goals 2000
legislation, which was concocted by President Bill Clinton in 1994,26 and to carry on
the tradition of setting specific standards of academic achievement.27  Goals 2000
itself was originally designed not just to enumerate certain specified performance-
based standards, but to establish a framework of broad based goals that would benefit
all students.28  It was designed to increase the federal role of accountability, as the
1988 reauthorization of ESEA only reached “20 percent of the nation’s students,”
those who at the time were eligible for Title I funding.29  With NCLB, federal edu-
cation policy took an even bolder step towards implementing broad-based standards
for improvement. Once designated as such, parents may request (1) a transfer for their child
to another public school, and/or (2) funding for any supplemental education by a state-approved
third party provider. Id.
25 See MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 33–34.
26 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994); see
MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 38.
27 This tradition was established in the early 1980s, when there was a fast-growing
concern regarding the quality of public education in the United States. In 1983 the National
Commission on Excellence in Education published a report entitled A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available
at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html. This report detailed the disturbing inade-
quacies that plagued the educational system at the time, and has been linked with the “blizzard
of state reforms in the 1980s.” MANNA supra note 13, at 12. In the years that followed its pub-
lication, education reform was viewed, at ever increasing rates, as one of the more pressing
issues of the day, finally spiking in the mid-to-late 1990s. See id. at 4 fig.1.1; Kamina Aliya
Pinder, Using Federal Law to Prescribe Pedagogy: Lessons Learned From the Scientifically-
Based Research Requirements of No Child Left Behind, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 72
(2008) (noting that by the late 1980s “the nation seemed to have responded to the growing
call for accountability in education”). What resulted was the call for specified performance-
based standards in education reform efforts, as most Americans at the time “believed that the
federal government should require states . . . to meet minimum academic standards.” Id. With
A Nation at Risk still fresh in many voters’ minds, politicians began to focus their education
platforms on the basis of improved performance and accountability standards. This led to the
popularization of the “standards movement” in the 1990s, and ultimately resulted in Goals
2000. See id.; MANNA supra note 13, at 12–13.
28 See MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 38–39. The framework was based upon ten goals:
1. Raising education standards and improving the quality of teachers;
2. Launching a major reading initiative; 3. Expanding Head Start; 4.
Expanding parental choice [using] charter schools; 5. Teaching char-
acter education; 6. Renovating old schools; 7. Building new schools;
8. Making completion of junior college rather than high school the uni-
versal standard; 9. Encouraging lifetime learning; and 10. Connecting
all schools to the Internet.
Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
29 MANNA, supra note 13, at 75.
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that would reach all, or substantially all, of the nation’s students.  It did so by requiring
proficiency reports based on the yearly testing of students between grades three and
eight.30  The law also provided that the states must administer a National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP) test every other year to allow the federal government
to publish a national report card for the nation’s schools.31  All of these requirements
were designed as conditions placed upon a state’s receipt of Title I funding, which
remains “the largest source of states’ elementary education funding from the federal
government.”32  The most notable condition placed on the receipt of Title I funding
is that each state must design and comply with an Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
program for improvement in student academic proficiency rates.33
A. Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
AYP is determined by each state and submitted to the Secretary of Education.34 
Despite potential economic heterogeneity within a state, the AYP program for each
state is required to apply each individual AYP measurement to all school districts
equally.35  This means that notwithstanding the original design of Title I funds,36 or the
publicly stated purpose of NCLB Title I expenditures,37 the law is written in a manner
that requires states to enter into a “high-stakes accountability system for all schools
and students.”38  While the law does require separate AYP measurements for particular
groups,39 the equal weight of these individual AYP levels across the state, coupled
30 NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., MAPPING 2005 STATE
PROFICIENCY STANDARDS ONTO THE NAEP SCALES iii (2007).
31 Id.; see also Nat’l Assessment of Educ. Progress, Nation’s Report Card, available at
http://nationsreportcard.gov/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2010); Note, No Child Left Behind and the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887–88 (2006).
32 Note, supra note 31, at 887.
33 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2006).
34 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(B); see also ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 161; Note, supra
note 31, at 887.
35 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(G)(ii); see also ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 161.
36 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 63 (“Title I has been the most reliable source of
‘compensatory’ education funds in the United States—money to supplement state and local
revenues for schools serving students from poor families.”). Title I was created to be the
major portion of “ESEA directed at improving schools in economically disadvantaged areas.”
Kathleen Sebelius & Ned Sebelius, Bearing the Burden of the Beltway: Practical Realities
of State Government and Federal-State Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 3 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 9, 17 (2009).
37 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 161.
38 See id. (emphasis added).
39 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(2)(C)(v), (b)(3)(C)(xiii), (h)(1)(C); Nicole Liguori, Note,
Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t Do As We Say): Connecticut’s
Challenge to the Federal Government’s Power to Control State Education Policy Through
the Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1048 (2006) (“States must make the test results
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with the 2014 deadline for complete proficiency, suggests that the AYP requirements
of NCLB are unsustainable.40
AYP levels and testing requirements were the main focus of debates during the
early stages of NCLB’s drafting in Congress.41  While supporters of the respective
House and Senate bills touted the flexibility in designing AYP proficiency levels,
there was growing concern over the practicality of some of the federal requirements—
namely the one hundred percent proficiency achievement by 2014.42  At one point it
was determined that the initially proposed AYP formula, a formula to be applied to
all states, was significantly flawed.43  The Senate committee discussing the bill, the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, took the proposed AYP for-
mula and “applied [it] . . . retroactively to Connecticut, North Carolina, and Texas.”44 
All three states had unquestionably made significant progress in “narrowing achieve-
ment gaps between student groups,” and yet all three states would have been labeled
as needing improvement when the committee applied the proposed AYP formula.45 
Needless to say, this created much concern within the Senate, and stalled the bill for
many weeks.46  While the proposed formula was adjusted to reflect some desired
changes, the initial problem regarding its application was never corrected.47  States
were given control of the scheduling, but the final requirements remained complex.48
When NCLB was drafted there were two major categories of AYP measurements:
proficiencies in mathematics and reading.49  Each individual AYP plan may vary,
since the states are required to develop separate AYP levels for all students, as well
available to the public annually, disaggregated within every state, district, and school by gender,
major racial and ethnic groups, English proficiency, migrant status, disability, and status as
economically disadvantaged . . . .”).
40 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 193 (“By not correctly distinguishing between schools
that are truly struggling and those that are not, [NCLB] may divert our concern from high-
poverty schools that need immediate help to the public education system as a whole. . . .
[E]rosion of public support is likely if schools are presumed to have failed simply because
the bar for success is set unrealistically high.”(citation omitted)).
41 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 129 (“Testing and AYP captured much of the spotlight
during 2001.”).
42 See id. at 124–30.
43 See id. at 124–25.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 125.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 129 (“[T]he final result still remained technically complex. . . . NCLB included
safe harbor provisions that allowed schools to comply with AYP rules even if achievement
for all pupil groups did not increase on schedule.” (citation omitted)).
49 Id. at 127–28 & tbl.6.1. In 2006, a third AYP category was added to measure profi-
ciency in science. Phillip T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit” or “Maximum Benefit”: Does the No
Child Left Behind Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities,
37 J.L. & EDUC. 347, 351 (2008).
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as “economically disadvantaged students; . . . students from major racial and ethnic
groups; . . . students with disabilities; and . . . students with limited English profi-
ciency.”50  At first glance, this language might suggest that states have increased flexi-
bility insofar as they could determine differing AYP levels for each distinguishable
category of students.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Each proficiency rating has
an ultimate requirement of one hundred percent proficiency achievement by the year
2014.51  In this respect, states are extremely limited by NCLB.52
Despite the fact that states design the AYP schedule they must ultimately follow,
each school district must strictly adhere to the schedule or face serious consequences
in the form of corrective action.  NCLB “does not prescribe how States must offi-
cially designate schools that do not meet AYP requirements,”53 but it does require
action following the second year of failure to achieve the AYP level scheduled.54 
Specifically with regard to Title I funding, should a school fail to attain AYP two
years in a row, all students must be given the option to attend a different school in
the district.55  If a school fails three years in a row, the law requires that the district
provide free tutoring and other supplemental academic enhancement programs.56 
Eventually, after four consecutive years of failure to achieve AYP, the state must
make significant modifications to the school, or district, in order to receive federal
50 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(I)–(II) (2006).
51 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 128 tbl.6.1.
52 Compare the AYP requirements of NCLB with statements made by President George
W. Bush during his first address to a joint session of Congress: “We should not and we will
not run public schools from Washington, D.C. Yet when the federal government spends tax
dollars, we must insist on results.” George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress on Administrative Goals, 2001 PUB. PAPERS 140, 141 (Feb. 27, 2001); see also
Sebelius & Sebelius, supra note 36, at 16–17. The program itself is consistent with account-
ability, but the restrictions imposed by the seemingly arbitrary 2014 complete proficiency
deadline causes one to question whether the schools are being constrained by this federal law.
53 Letter from Rod Paige, Secretary of Education, to Education Officials (July 24, 2002),
available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/020724.html.
54 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 128.
55 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Adequate Yearly Progress, http://answers.ed.gov/ (follow link
for 15: Schools not making adequate yearly progress) (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
56 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(e)(12)(C) (2006) (defining “supplemental educational services”
(SES)). In addition, the school will “be required to make major changes [to its] . . . personnel
and possibly its organization.” MANNA, supra note 13, at 128 tbl.6.1. There is a certain moral
hazard created by SES requirements at this stage of corrective action. This is because those
who tutor under an SES program are typically the teachers in the school district that has
failed to make AYP. While it is not suggested that teachers would purposely fail to achieve
AYP in their classrooms in order to supplement their income with SES tutoring programs,
it is odd that NCLB would consider SES tutoring provided by the same individuals who
failed to make AYP a corrective action. For a further discussion of this issue, see Frederick
M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr., Conclusion: Can This Law Be Fixed? A Hard Look at the
NCLB Remedies, in NO REMEDY LEFT BEHIND: LESSONS FROM A HALF-DECADE OF NCLB
309, 315 (Frederick M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 2007).
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funds.57  Such changes include reopening the school as a public charter school, re-
placing all or most of the staff, hiring a private management company to take over the
school, or forcing the state to run the school.58  Obviously such changes are potentially
drastic, and extremely costly.
In practice, the law’s inevitable implosion is the consequence of a certain moral
hazard created by the reauthorization requirements.  It is recognized that “NCLB con-
tains incentives for perverse behavior,” and as a result, the states have been taking sig-
nificant risks.59  States, aware that they would need to achieve one hundred percent
proficiency by 2014, essentially gambled on whether or not the requirements would
be reconsidered in 2007, when the law was up for reauthorization.60  As a result, most
schools self-scheduled their yearly proficiency levels to be low in the early years.61 
Twenty-three states structured their achievement plans in accordance with this sup-
position, requiring smaller gains in the earlier years, and steeper gains following
2007.62  California was one such state, and is currently experiencing some of the most
drastic increases.63  In 2001, the state had “13.6 percent of [its] students proficient
in reading.”64  In response, it promised a yearly progress rate of 2.2% between 2002
and 2007.65  Afterwards, the rate would balloon near eleven percent each year until
the 2014 deadline.66  Even former Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings has
acknowledged that this problem is serious, and “something we need to address.”67
While some schools are engineering lower expectations,68 others are asking
simply for more time.  With the 2007 reauthorization date having come and gone,
and the AYP requirements remaining intact, states are scrambling in their efforts to
comply with NCLB in order to maintain their source of federal education funding. 
While publicly offering steadfast support for the 2014 deadline for proficiency,69 the
Department of Education has been flexible in allowing the states to strategically
57 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 128 tbl.6.1.
58 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No Child Left Behind, Accountability and Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP), http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/ayp203/edlite-slide018.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2010).
59 See Will, supra note 14 (suggesting that the law will be reauthorized, “because doubling
down on losing bets is what Washington does”).
60 See Sam Dillon, Under ‘No Child’ Law, Even Solid Schools Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2008, at A1.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See Sam Dillon, Federal Researchers Find Lower Standards in Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2009, at A22.
69 Dillon, supra note 60.
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achieve the requisite AYP.70  For example, many states have requested and received
approval for the use of confidence intervals in the statistical calculations of student
proficiency.71  Applying these confidence intervals to student proficiency levels allows
for some “wiggle room,” making it far easier to demonstrate that the academic profi-
ciency within a district falls in the margin of error allowed by the AYP plan.72  Some
states continue to maneuver in hopes that the law will be changed,73 while others have
sought to enforce the unfunded mandates clause which could conceivably be read
as requiring the federal government to pay for statewide AYP compliance.74
B. Unfunded Mandates Clause
Section 7907(a), or the unfunded mandates clause, is one of the more highly
controversial provisions of NCLB. It provides that,
[n]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed to authorize an officer
or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or
control a State, local educational agency, or school’s curriculum,
program of instruction, or allocation of State or local resources,
or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds
or incur any costs not paid for under this Act.75
A casual reading could lead one to assume that nothing resulting from NCLB, whether
it be by statute or regulation, could force an unfunded mandate upon the states.  In-
deed, this is what some have argued, particularly pointing out that this provision pre-
vents the states or school districts from having to spend additional funds to pay for
NCLB compliance.76  Those that have made such claims conclude that states are
70 Center on Education Policy, States Test Limits of Federal AYP Flexibility: Process for
Amending State NCLB Accountability Plans Needs to be More Transparent, Report Charges,
Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.cep-dc.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=feature.showFeature&FeatureID=
15&varuniqueuserid=73007196965 [hereinafter States Test Limits].
71 See id.; Daniel deVise, ‘Safe Harbor’ Offers Shelter From Strict ‘No Child’ Targets,
WASH. POST, April 7, 2008, at B1.
72 States Test Limits, supra note 70. Looking at New Mexico as an example:
Prior to the introduction of a confidence interval, a New Mexico school
had to have 37 percent of its students scoring at the proficient level or
higher . . . to make AYP. But now, with the confidence interval, a high
school in New Mexico with 300 students can make AYP if [only] 31
percent of its students score at the proficient level.
Id.
73 Dillon, supra note 60.
74 See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text.
75 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
76 See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text; see also Sam Dillon, Judge Dismisses
Connecticut’s Challenge to Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A13.
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neither required to fund AYP testing, nor take any such corrective action resulting
from non-compliance.  “Connecticut, for example, claim[ed] that it lack[ed] the
$41.6 million necessary to comply with the Act’s requirement that testing be con-
ducted every year for elementary school students.”77  While this particular argument
has yet to persuade a court,78 it has fueled the similar claim that the unfunded man-
dates clause in and of itself is ambiguous and potentially misleading.79 With so much
money on the line, some states have abandoned their own testing systems entirely in
favor of a national standard.80  There can be no doubt as to the effect that NCLB has
had on states and school districts, but the question becomes whether this clause in
conjunction with the requirements of the law suggests that those effects have been
coercive or voluntary.
II. CLEAR STATEMENT ANALYSIS FOR CONDITIONAL GRANTS
Once they accept federal funds proffered by NCLB, states and their respective
school districts become “prisoners of th[e] law.”81  The obligations imposed by the
77 Liguori, supra note 39, at 1035. Connecticut was also required by state law to use
Connecticut Mastery Tests (CMT) to evaluate its students. There were inconsistencies with
the application of the federal testing requirements and the CMT requirements. For instance,
the CMTs at the time were administered in alternate years instead of annually. See id. at
1053–54 (“Connecticut requires public school students in fourth, sixth, and eighth grades to
take the CMT . . . .”). As a result Connecticut was compelled to spend a significant portion
of its own state funds to bring its own testing into compliance with NCLB. This was required
despite the fact that the CMTs were widely viewed as successful testing devices, and
Connecticut students typically “rank among the highest . . . in the nation.” Id. at 1053. In fact,
commenting on the lawsuit shortly after it was filed, Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal pointed out the success of the CMT program. News & Notes: Connecticut Sues
Over ‘No Child Left Behind’ (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 24, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4813502 (commenting that “for more
than two decades [Connecticut] has done testing every other year and we have a proud record
of improving educational achievement in our state, of narrowing the gaps that exist in achieve-
ment, of raising the bar and the standards here in Connecticut, through alternate-year testing.
And if the federal government wants to impose those mandates [that require annual testing],
it should fund them”). The CMTs have since been modified to comply with NCLB’s annual
testing requirements, and now test students in grades three, four, five, six, seven, and eight. See
CONNECTICUT STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., CONNECTICUT MASTERY TEST: FOURTH GENERATION:
MATHEMATICS HANDBOOK vii (2006), available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/
curriculum/math/cmtgeneralinformation.pdf.
78 Dillon, supra note 76.
79 See infra Part III.B.
80 Sebelius & Sebelius, supra note 36, at 17 (“NCLB led Kansas to abandon a successful
statewide protocol in favor of additional national tests because of the fear of losing federal
funding.”).
81 See Walsh, supra note 18, at 7 (quoting Robert H. Chanin, general counsel of the
National Education Association).
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law often escalate, along with the costs of compliance, and federal funds too often fall
short.82  In an ideal situation, there would be no informational asymmetry, and all
interested parties would understand the consequences of entering into a government
program.  Yet, with a program as large as NCLB, it is often understood that unin-
tended consequences and unanticipated costs, particularly at the local level, are likely
to arise.  Over the past three decades it has become the norm for federal education
policies to engender costs that must be absorbed at the local level.83  For this very
reason, there was a significant fear of unfunded mandates being levied on the states,
spurring lengthy discussions during the original debate over NCLB.84  The end result
was the above-mentioned statutory language contained in § 7907(a), the unfunded
mandates clause.85  The outrage expressed by those who challenge the unfunded man-
dates clause is not that the costs of compliance are staggeringly high, although that
certainly helps fuel the fire, but rather that Congress had been wary of such costs and
drafted the specific language to ease the tension.  The most recent challenge argued
first that the clause suggests the federal government must pay for these costs.86  In the
alternative, the school districts challenged NCLB on the whole as being poorly drafted
and unconstitutionally ambiguous, relying on § 7907(a).87
Both the federal government and the states have acknowledged that the unfunded
mandate clause is ambiguous in some regards.88  The Department of Education has
interpreted these ambiguities as merely reflective of Congress’s decision to defer to
the Department when forcing states to spend their own money.89  On the other hand,
many states have suggested that such ambiguities necessarily trigger the clear state-
ment rule discussed in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy and similar cases.90  The clear statement rule is designed to act as a limita-
tion on the congressional power to spend, and it has been suggested that, insofar as
NCLB is concerned, the time has come for Congress to stop attempting to skirt this
limitation by coercing compliance and state expenditures.91
82 See id.
83 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 100.
84 Id.
85 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
86 See infra Part III.B.
87 See infra Part III.B.
88 See Walsh, supra note 18.
89 See id.
90 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1981) (“Congress must
express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that states can
knowingly decide whether or not to accept those funds.”); Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d
593, 598 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that “the states must not be left to guess at federal intentions
in their own budgetary planning process”).
91 ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 169–70 (“It is time Congress stopped trying to circumvent
the constitutional limitations on its authority by using the people’s own money to bribe [states]
into complying with unconstitutional federal dictates.” (quoting Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX))).
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A. The Clear Statement Rule
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress enjoys a fairly broad
power to spend in furtherance of the nation’s general welfare.92  Indeed, the Court
has consistently permitted the congressional conditioning of federal funds.93  When
developing legislation, the Spending Clause allows Congress to induce behavior by
attaching conditions to any financial support it provides.94  The Supreme Court has
also acknowledged that such powers to condition funding are subject to certain re-
strictions.95  Chief among these restrictions is that such conditions must be expressly
stated, and have some legitimate relation to the federal interest at stake.96
In South Dakota v. Dole the Court was asked to determine the validity of a con-
dition imposed upon a particular state grant.97  Specifically, the Court upheld a federal
statute that conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds, authorizing only those
states with a valid minimum drinking age to receive the funds in full.98  In doing so,
the Court cautiously noted that Congress, should it desire to impose conditions upon
“the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . , [allowing]
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.’”99  This limitation has been referred to as the clear statement rule.100
As a result of this rule, Congress must be clear and precise when it dictates con-
ditions for state receipt of federal funds.  The operative language, which the Court
continues to apply, is whether the state entering into the federal agreement does so
“knowingly” and “voluntarily.”101  Such an agreement is often viewed as a contract
92 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64–66 (1936).
93 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“Our cases have identified
a variety of methods . . . by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program
consistent with federal interests.”); see also, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 427 (1970);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm., 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
94 New York, 505 U.S. at 166–67; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”).
95 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
96 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 203 (1997).
Also, of particular interest in NCLB commentary, another such limitation is that Congress must
not make the financial inducement “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns
into compulsion.’” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court,
58 DUKE L.J. 345, 355 (2008) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
97 483 U.S. at 205.
98 Id. The statute withheld five percent of the federal highway funds allocable to the state,
unless the state in question had a law on the books requiring the minimum age for purchase
or possession of alcoholic beverages to be no less than twenty-one. Id. at 205, 211; see also
23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (amended in 1998 to withhold ten percent).
99 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1981) (alteration in original)).
100 See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 878 (2008).
101 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’s power to legislate under the
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between the federal government and the state accepting the funds.102  The knowing
and voluntary aspect of that particular contract ceases to exist, and there can be no
acknowledgeable agreement, should its terms and conditions leave a state unaware
of its obligations.103  Typically this requirement can be satisfied upon a finding by a
court that the conditions upon which a state is to receive federal funding “could not
be more clearly stated.”104  This is not to suggest that the requirement ought to be con-
strued in the light most favorable to Congress.  Rather, courts have interpreted the
clear statement rule to require the resolution of ambiguities in favor of the states.105 
If such ambiguities were not construed against the drafter, namely Congress, the fed-
eral government would otherwise be able to hamper state governments in their ability
to budget their own spending obligations.106
Congress, in enacting NCLB pursuant to its authority derived from the Spending
Clause, was obligated to adhere to the clear statement rule.  Congress was not required
to detail the expected costs of compliance over the lifespan of NCLB, or even remove
any potential unfunded mandates.  It needed only to ensure that the statute was devoid
of ambiguous clauses in those sections that imposed conditions on the receipt of
Title I funds.  Consequently, the language of NCLB had to be specific enough such that
a court could find that the law “could not [have been] more clearly stated.”107  The clear
statement rule was later explained to require that, in cases of voluntary programs with
conditional congressional spending, such conditions must be specified so that a state
official would reasonably have been put on notice of the obligations such conditions
would entail.108  Specifically, the unfunded mandates clause violates the clear state-
ment rule if a state official could not have been placed on such reasonable notice.109
B. Recent Clear Statement Application and the Unfunded Mandates Clause
In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled on a case involving a federal education statute,
and found it lacked the degree of notice required by the clear statement rule.110  In
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, the Court reviewed
a provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) that allowed
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms
of the ‘contract.’”).
102 See id.; Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through
the Dole Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 183 (2001).
103 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
104 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; see also McConville, supra note 102, at 183.
105 Coleman v. Glynn, 983 F.2d 737, 737 (6th Cir. 1993) (Merritt, C.J., concurring).
106 Id.
107 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
108 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
109 See id.
110 Id. at 300.
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for parents to recover “‘reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of [their] costs’” in suc-
cessful IDEA actions.111  At issue was whether this provision extended recovery for
services rendered by an expert in any given IDEA action.112  The focus of this inquiry
was on the definition of the term “costs,” and whether that term included expert
services.113  In determining that IDEA did not extend such recovery to plaintiffs, the
Court relied on clear statement concerns.114  Although “costs” might be viewed as a
straightforward term, the Court found it ambiguous enough to prevent the inclusion
of expert services in its definition.115
It has since been suggested that Arlington indicates a more expansive role that the
Court intends to take with regard to Spending Clause litigation.116  The Court “went
out of its way” to address the Spending Clause issues in IDEA,117 when it could have
otherwise determined that the provision did not apply to expert services under simple
statutory construction.118  If inclusion of the word “costs” led to ambiguity in IDEA,
similar usage of the term in § 7907(a) might also create uncertainty.119  “Costs” was
a restrictive term in Arlington, such that it excluded expert fees, because such ambi-
guities are construed in favor of the states.120  Should the term in the unfunded man-
dates clause become an issue, it too would be construed in favor of the states, resulting
in an inclusive reading.  This would suggest that the prohibition in § 7907(a) ought to
apply to a wide range of costs.  This term, however, is not the underlying controversy
in the litigation that states have undertaken to challenge the clarity of NCLB.  It merely
serves as an illustration that potential ambiguity abounds in § 7907(a).  Indeed, the
linchpin phrase appears to be that nothing shall “authorize an officer or employee
of the Federal Government to mandate.”121  In recent years, states and their school
districts have sought to litigate this issue in order to escape the confines of NCLB.
III. PONTIAC V. SPELLINGS AND OTHER STATE CHALLENGES
By adding the unfunded mandates language, Congress created significant ambi-
guity as to how the states themselves ought to finance their NCLB compliance.  When
111 Id. at 293–94 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006)).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 296–98.
114 See id. at 296–300.
115 Id. at 300.
116 Bagenstos, supra note 96, at 408–10.
117 Id. at 350–51.
118 See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 304–05 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
119 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006) (“Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to . . . mandate
a State . . . to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this [Act].”(emphasis
added)).
120 See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 301–03.
121 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a); see also Michael J. Pendell, How Far is Too Far?: The
Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Education State’s Battle Against Unfunded
Mandates, 71 ALB. L. REV. 519, 537 (2008); infra Part III.B.
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coupled with the lofty, and often penalizing, requirements of NCLB, the unfunded
mandates clause creates non-trivial budgeting concerns in many states.122  Though the
onus has thus far been placed upon the states to take any financial hit for additional
funding, the unfunded mandates clause, as currently written, would lead one to ques-
tion whether this particular burden was intended to be placed on the states.  As these
types of ambiguities are typically read in favor of the states,123 if a question remains
as to who should pay for compliance, the state or the federal government, it is the fed-
eral government who must pony up.124  If one thing is clear from the recent challenges
discussed below, it is that NCLB is itself unclear.125
A. State Challenges to NCLB Clarity
States have sought to challenge NCLB, and specifically the unfunded mandates
clause, as being overly burdensome and ambiguous.126  Not only does NCLB leave
doubt as to how states are to obtain federal education funding, but it is also unclear
with respect to the impact on states opting out of the law.  Indeed, when Utah sought
to opt out in 2004, the “Secretary of Education [had to inform] the Utah Legislature
that opting out of NCLB would result in not only a loss of $43 million in Title I
funds, but also a forfeiture of any funds that rely on the Title I formula.”127  That the
Secretary of Education had to inform the State of Utah of this fact further indicates
that the law itself is not clearly defined.  Some have argued that mere opting out un-
certainty is enough to strike down NCLB.128
In 2005 the State of Connecticut sued the federal government challenging, inter
alia, the unfunded mandates clause and its application.129  The main allegation was
122 This is particularly true with respect to those school districts that have consistently
failed to achieve AYP in consecutive years, an ever increasing number. See, e.g., Dillon,
supra note 60.
123 See Coleman v. Glynn, 983 F.2d 737, 737 (6th Cir. 1993) (Merritt, C.J., concurring)
(stating that unless “ambiguous language [is construed] in favor of the states, states will be
unable to plan, and adopt intelligently, budgets itemizing their spending obligations”); see
also Galle, supra note 100, at 876 (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that conditions attached by
Congress to federal grants . . . should be interpreted strictly against Congress . . . .”) (citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
124 For a detailed discussion of the argument that the unfunded mandates clause “is ambig-
uous on the question [of] whether states and school districts can be required to use their own
funds for . . . compliance,” see Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 23, Sch. Dist.
of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-2708).
125 This is likely a result of the language contained in the unfunded mandates clause. See
20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
126 See, e.g., Liguori, supra note 39, at 1035.
127 Pendell, supra note 121, at 537.
128 See id.
129 See Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 480 (D. Conn. 2006). For a discussion
of the rationale underlying the original complaint, see Liguori, supra note 39, at 1052–59.
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that the federal government was not providing the state with an adequate level of
funding, thereby violating the unfunded mandates clause.130  The state accused the
President and his “administration of being ‘rigid, arbitrary and capricious’ in the
enforcement” of NCLB.131  It also argued that it was being denied “due process by
refusing [its] request to continue its 20-year tradition of testing in alternate years,
instead of every year from grades three through eight.”132  The court, however, dis-
missed Connecticut’s claim for lacking subject matter jurisdiction.133  Thus, the court
did not clarify the meaning of the unfunded mandates clause, nor did it address the
issue of whether the clause itself was ambiguous enough in its language to indicate
a constitutional violation.134  As a result, the National Education Association (NEA),
and several school districts brought another such suit.135
B. Pontiac v. Spellings
The plaintiffs in Pontiac, nine school districts and multiple education associations
from various states,136 alleged that the unfunded mandates clause does not require
states to cover the additional costs of compliance.137  Specifically, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the clause is violated if the federal government requires the “states and
school districts to comply fully with all of the NCLB mandates even though [they]
have not been provided with sufficient federal funds to pay for such compliance.”138 
130 Liguori, supra note 39, at 1052–53.
131 Sam Dillon, U.S. is Sued by Connecticut Over Mandates on School Tests, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2005, at B1.
132 Joan Indiana Rigdon, No Child Left Behind Act, WASH. LAW., April 2008, available
at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/april_2008/
no_child.cfm.
133 Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
134 Initially the court noted that “nothing in this decision should be construed as determin-
ing (one way or the other) whether the State’s arguments regarding the Unfunded Mandates
Provision and the Constitution are properly before the Court.” Id. at 502. On a subsequent
motion for judgment on the administrative record, the court stated that it “wishes to be clear
that it has not ruled on the merits of the State’s Unfunded Mandates Provision claim because
the argument was never made.” Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 181 (D. Conn.
2008); see also Dillon, supra note 76.
135 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29253 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005), rev’d sub nom. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ.,
512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (plurality opinion
affirming district court); see also, Sam Dillon, Teachers’ Union and Districts Sue Over Bush
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at A1.
136 There were eight distinguishable school districts and Rutland Northeast Supervisory
Union, which included eleven other school districts. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ.,
584 F.3d 253, 256 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2009).
137 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 256–57 (6th Cir.), vacated,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (6th Cir. 2008).
138 See Pontiac, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253 at *3 (quoting language from the Plaintiffs’
Complaint).
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As one example, the plaintiffs pointed out that Illinois will spend $15.4 million
in order to comply with NCLB testing requirements each year, while only $13 mil-
lion will be provided to the state by the federal government for testing purposes.139 
Another example exists in the State of Connecticut, where federal funding for “tech-
nical assistance” accounts for approximately one percent of the total cost of NCLB
compliance.140  Such significant shortfalls suggest that federal funding is “woefully in-
adequate,” and consequently inhibits, more than it advances, compliance with NCLB.141 
In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the unfunded mandates clause was un-
clear and ambiguous, and was thereby unenforceable as a violation of Congress’s
powers pursuant to the Spending Clause.142  They sought injunctive relief, prohibiting
the federal government from either forcing compliance with NCLB, or withholding
Title I funding as a result of their noncompliance.143
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the case for
failure to state a claim.144  In doing so, however, the court interpreted the unfunded
mandates clause in a rather inconsistent manner.  It determined that the unfunded
mandates clause did not claim that “federal funding would pay for 100% of all NCLB
requirements.”145  The court stated that if this is what Congress had intended, it would
have phrased the clause “to say so clearly and unambiguously.”146  While this may
be true, it ignores the fundamental point that the plaintiffs had also argued—that the
clause is itself unclear and ambiguous.  The district court appears to have concluded
that the correct interpretation is one suggested by the Secretary,147 that the clause
merely prohibits “officers or employees” from incurring costs not paid for under
NCLB; but the district court never explicitly stated that the unfunded mandates clause
is consistent with the constitutional requirements of being clearly stated.
The plaintiffs would later argue on appeal that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
was not required to settle on one particular interpretation of the unfunded mandates
clause in order to find a constitutional violation.148  Both the original panel opinion
and the plurality opinion when the case was reheard devoted significant amounts of
space to the multiple ways in which the statute could be read.149  The following
139 Id. at *5.
140 Id.
141 Id. at *4–5.
142 See id. at *5–6; Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 257.
143 Pontiac, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at *6.
144 Id. at *13.
145 Id. at *12.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *11–13.
148 Final Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 29, Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of
Educ., 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-2708) (stating that if the court simply finds any
ambiguity then “plaintiffs’ construction surely would have to be viewed as another permissible
reading” as a result of the “clear statement rule”).
149 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 271–76 (6th Cir. 2009); Sch.
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section details the ways in which the unfunded mandates clause may be interpreted,
relying primarily on the original opinion of the Sixth Circuit.150  While this opinion
was subsequently vacated upon a successful petition for a rehearing en banc, the
logic remains the exact same in the subsequent plurality opinion issued following
the rehearing.151
1. The Unfunded Mandates Clause and its Many Interpretations
In its analysis, the court discussed three distinct interpretations of the provision.152 
Two of the three possible interpretations of the statutory language were offered by the
Secretary of Education (the “Secretary”), the first of which was ultimately granted
primacy by the district court.153  While these first two interpretations are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, the simple fact that the Secretary herself offered more than
one possible reading indicates the high probability for ambiguity.
First, the court reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the unfunded man-
dates clause.154  This reading was the first of two interpretations that represented the
Secretary’s argument with respect to the provision, and was labeled the “Rogue . . .
Officers or Employees” interpretation.155  The district court ruled that the inclusion
of the words “authorize an officer or employee” would necessarily entail that “Congress
clearly . . . [intended] to prohibit federal officers and employees from imposing addi-
tional, unfunded requirements, beyond those provided for in the statute.”156  The
Secretary, in agreement, argued that the intention of the clause was to prohibit these
officers or employees from effectively micromanaging the affairs of school districts,
and to disallow specific expenditures unauthorized by the law.157  In this regard, the
Secretary reasoned that the unfunded mandates clause was crafted to forbid man-
dates upon curriculum or staffing changes, and prohibit any forced expenses related
Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 264–69 (6th Cir.), vacated, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12121 (6th Cir. 2008).
150 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 252.
151 Compare id., with Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009).
The two opinions were written by the same author, but this plurality opinion has no bearing
on the ultimate Pontiac decision. For a discussion of why, see infra notes 199–202 and
accompanying text.
152 See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 264–69.
153 Id. at 265–66.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 265.
156 Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005).
157 Supplemental Brief for the Secretary of Education on Rehearing En Banc at 10, Sch.
Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 05-2708). This particular
brief, written after the court of appeals discredited the rogue officer or employee interpretation,
argues that § 7907(a) ought to be read so as to disallow specific expenditures.
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to per pupil spending, teacher salaries, or education equipment.158  This, of course,
suggests that the clause does not reach broader issues of AYP compliance or district-
wide annual testing.
In its analysis, the court found two substantive problems with this first interpre-
tation.159  One problem, the court argued, was that the phrase “officer or employee”
was included to modify only the first part of the clause.160  The court found that the
unfunded mandates clause has two parts, leading towards two separate conclusions:
(1) Officers or employees may not “mandate, direct, or control a State, local educa-
tional agency, or school’s curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State
or local resources . . . ;”161 and (2) “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to . . .
mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not
paid for.”162  Part (1) leads to a conclusion that is consistent with the Secretary’s first
argument, that the clause seeks to merely prohibit micromanagement by officers or
employees.  Part (2), however, tailors itself to the argument made by the plaintiffs.163 
In this respect, the district court erred in determining that the Secretary’s interpretation,
Part (1), was the only reasonable interpretation.
The other problem results if the phrase “authorize an officer or employee” is read
to modify the second part of the clause. This phrase, coupled with the Secretary’s argu-
ment that the provision is intended to prohibit unauthorized management, leads the
reader to inconsistent language.  The Secretary’s interpretation would have the reader
assume the unfunded mandates clause to state something that it does not actually
state.  Namely, that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an officer
or employee of the Federal Government to . . . mandate . . . costs not [authorized
under this Act].”164  In actuality, the text reads “[n]othing in this [Act] shall be con-
strued to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to mandate . . .
costs not paid for under this [Act].”165  Because the current status of the law is to
allow “officers or employees” to require that states fund AYP compliance and
annual testing out of funds that are not provided by NCLB, clearly these “officers
or employees” are able to mandate that states pay for costs not “paid for” by NCLB. 
The rogue officer or employee interpretation only makes sense if you read into the
158 Id. These are just a few examples offered by the Secretary.
159 See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 265–66.
160 Id.
161 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006).
162 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 266 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a)).
163 Final Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Pontiac School District at 29, Sch. Dist.
of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-2708) (stating that if the
court simply finds any ambiguity then “plaintiffs’ construction surely would have to be viewed
as another permissible reading” as a result of the “clear statement rule”).
164 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 266 (rewriting the language of 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) to match the
argument made by the Secretary, and upheld by the district court) (alterations in original).
165 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (emphasis added).
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“paid for” language the additional language of authorization.  This, however, indi-
cates that the Secretary’s argument would lead to an inevitable tautology, namely that
the law does not authorize an officer or employee from doing that which is unautho-
rized.  To use some of the district court’s logic, if Congress had actually intended to
include the circular language necessary to reach the Secretary’s initial interpretation,
it could have expressly done so with the aforementioned modification suggested by
the court.166  The fact that it had not done so led the court to find the rogue officer or
employee interpretation to be unconvincing.167
Second, the court analyzed the defendant’s other suggested reading of the un-
funded mandates language.168  This interpretation, advanced by the Secretary, empha-
sized the overall voluntary nature of NCLB.169  The suggestion is that the unfunded
mandates clause simply restates the fact that states may choose to accept NCLB fund-
ing, along with its terms and conditions, on a voluntary basis.170  Emphasis was put
on the term “mandate” so that the clause itself became a simple reiteration of the
notion that the federal government cannot, by its officers or employees, compel the
states to spend money.171  Of course, once the states voluntarily became complicit with
NCLB itself, this point becomes moot.172  In many respects, the unfunded mandates
language, according to this second interpretation, exists solely for the benefit of states
not adhering to NCLB, or receiving its funds.
The Secretary attempted to make this second reading clear by comparing the un-
funded mandates language, and its underlying purpose, to the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).173  That particular law was drafted in response to a
growing desire for more oversight of the costs placed upon state and local govern-
ments that were mandated by the federal government.174  The UMRA introduced new
procedures designed to increase clarity when Congress conditioned federal funding.175 
While it was not argued that NCLB would fall under the purview of the UMRA, the
Secretary suggested that NCLB was decisively excluded from the UMRA because
of its voluntary nature.176  The UMRA excludes from the requirements placed upon
166 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 266.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id.; see also Supplemental Brief for the Sec’y of Educ., supra note 157, at 15–17.
170 Supplemental Brief for the Sec’y of Educ., supra note 157, at 15–17.
171 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 266–67 (alluding to language specific to the unfunded mandates
clause at 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a)).
172 Supplemental Brief for the Sec’y of Educ., supra note 157, at 15–17.
173 See 2 U.S.C. § 658(5) (2006).
174 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNFUNDED MANDATES: ANALYSIS OF REFORM ACT
COVERAGE 3 (2004).
175 See id. at 1–3.
176 See Final Brief for the Appellee at 22, Pontiac, 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008) (No.
05-2708).
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“federal intergovernmental mandate[s]” those programs that are voluntary in partici-
pation.177  Using this language, the Secretary attempted to draw parallels between the
two laws, and to argue that the reason to include “unfunded mandates” language in
NCLB was to distinguish the law as one such voluntary program that falls outside
the scope of the UMRA.178
The court did not buy this argument, and suggested that the language would be
severely different had it been the intention of the clause to reflect and reiterate the
voluntariness of the program.179  In addressing this issue, the court drew its own par-
allels between NCLB and the language found in another law, the Perkins Vocational
Education Act (the “Perkins Act”).180  The language of section 2306a(a) of the Perkins
Act closely mirrors that of the unfunded mandates clause: “Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to . . . mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur
any costs not paid for under this Act, except as required under sections 112(b), 311(b),
and 323 [of this Act].”181  Not only are the two unfunded mandates clauses similar,
but the court found particular importance in the fact that the Perkins Act expressly
excepts certain instances where a state is expected to spend its own funds.182  The fact
that no such exceptions exist in NCLB’s unfunded mandates language suggests a
broader reading of the clause.183  Consequently, the court found this second interpre-
tation posed by the Secretary to be narrow, mistaken, and equally unconvincing.184
Third, the court reviewed yet another interpretation of the unfunded mandates
clause that had been offered by the plaintiffs.185  The plaintiffs contended that there
are, in fact, two separate and distinct limitations on NCLB conditional requirements
indicated by the unfunded mandates clause:186  one, that “[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed to authorize an officer or employee . . . to mandate, direct, or control, a State,
local educational agency, or school’s curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation
of State or local resources,” which the plaintiffs referred to as the “no-federal-control
proviso”; and two, that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to . . . mandate a State
or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under
177 See 2 U.S.C. § 658(5).
178 See Final Brief for the Appellee, supra note 176, at 22.
179 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267 (The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not dispute their
own voluntary acceptance of the program.).
180 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2471 (1988)).
181 Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Educ. Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-270, 120 Stat.
683, 690–91 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 2306a(a) (2006)).
182 See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 268 (“In the Perkins Act, the 62-word provision is followed
by exceptions to the provision. In NCLB, the 62-word provision is followed by no exceptions.
The difference between the Perkins Act and NCLB in this regard shows that Congress is
capable of explicitly stating when States must provide funding . . . .”).
183 See id.
184 Id. at 268–69.
185 Id.
186 Final Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 163, at 15–17.
1150 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1129
this Act,” referred to as the “no-state-or-local-funds proviso.”187  Both of these identi-
fiable provisions work in tandem with the court’s above-mentioned discussion of how
the phrase “officer or employee” actually modifies the text.188  The court determined
that the plaintiffs’ interpretation, insofar as it acknowledged that the states were not
required to comply with NCLB conditions that were not fully funded, was at the very
least, a reasonable interpretation.189
In efforts to provide an auxiliary analysis of the unfunded mandates clause, the
court discussed at length the legislative history supporting this third suggested inter-
pretation.  The language of the unfunded mandates clause predates NCLB, and was
included in three separate education statutes passed in 1994.190  The court cited state-
ments made by certain House representatives in order to demonstrate that Congress
never intended to hold states and localities responsible for requirements that were un-
funded or underfunded by the federal government.191  NCLB’s sponsor in the Senate,
Sen. Judd Gregg, explained that the proposed amendment, which would later become
the unfunded mandates clause, was introduced “to assure that [NCLB would] . . . not
become an unfunded mandate” and further, that “the Federal Government w[ould]
have to pay for the costs of that mandate” on states.192
Moreover, when the original language of the amendment was considered prior
to the inclusion of the unfunded mandates provision in the Improving America’s
Schools Act (IASA),193  similar discussions were held on the floor of both the Senate
and the House.  Indeed, the early debates and discussions of the IASA were “rife with
criticisms that the bill ‘provide[d] all the mandates, but no money to pay for them.’”194 
Once the appropriate language, not dissimilar to the unfunded mandates clause of
NCLB, was added to the IASA bill, the friction quickly dissolved.195  Indeed, before
the vote on the conference report, it was mentioned that the language of the new
provision, “clearly states that if any requirement in this bill results in an unfunded
mandate, affected States and communities do not have to comply.”196  In considering
this history, the court noted that the evidence lent itself more persuasively towards
the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the unfunded mandates clause.197  All the evidentiary
187 Id. (quoting language from 20 U.S.C. § 9527(a)).
188 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 265–66.
189 Id. at 267. That is not to say, however, that this particular interpretation is the only
correct reading of the statute.
190 Id. at 269–70.
191 Id. at 270.
192 Id. (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. S626 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1994) (amendment no. 1358, as
modified)).
193 See Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994).
194 Final Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 163, at 37 (quoting 140 Cong.
Rec. H807 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (Representative Barrett)).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 38 (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. S14205 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (Senator Durenberger)).
197 Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 271.
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support, coupled with a few questionable interpretations, led the court to acknowl-
edge that the plaintiffs’ interpretation was at the very least reasonable.  Recall that the
standard, as restated in Arlington, is whether it can be said that a state official would
clearly understand his or her obligations upon entering into the federal program.198 
That a reasonable reading of the unfunded mandates clause could be one in which states
are not required to fund NCLB compliance suggests that a reasonable state official
would not clearly understand his or her state’s obligations in accepting Title I funds.
2. The Sixth Circuit Suggests a Clear Statement Violation
Although the original panel decision written by Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr. was
vacated when the petition for a rehearing en banc was granted,199 the plurality opinion
issued following the rehearing adhered to the same logic.  This comes as no surprise,
as it too was authored by Judge Cole.200  Seven other judges agreed with his logic,
which suggests that the Sixth Circuit might entertain such a claim brought by states
and school districts.201  However, the decision of the district court dismissing the claim
was upheld by rule, since the court did not have more than eight members joining
Judge Cole’s plurality opinion.202  While it remains the opinion of the court, it is
important to note that Judge Cole’s analysis of the many interpretations holds no
weight in Pontiac since the case itself was dismissed.203  Nevertheless, the record
prevails as the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the unfunded mandates clause.  As a result,
should this issue be re-litigated, there is significant evidence of the many ambiguities
contained in NCLB.  The Supreme Court ought to seize this as an opportunity to
address congressional spending,204 and the plaintiffs in Pontiac should likewise appeal
to the Court.
During oral arguments when Pontiac was reheard, Judge McKeague referenced
other language in Title I and suggested that “Congress anticipated there may well be
costs not reimbursed”; while Judge Sutton further stated that “the [Secretary] gets
to fill in the gaps” with regard to any ambiguity.205  Still, despite these statements,
the constitutional issue remains whether states anticipated that there would be costs
not fully funded or otherwise reimbursed.  Were Congress to have equivocated, or
purposely left in ambiguities in which states should reasonably anticipate that the
198 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
199 Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., No. 05-2708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121
(6th Cir. May 1, 2008).
200 Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009).
201 See Mark Walsh, NCLB Suit’s Dismissal Intact After Deadlock By 6th Circuit Judges,
EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 28, 2009, at 8.
202 Pontiac, 584 F.3d 253; Walsh, supra note 201.
203 Walsh, supra note 201.
204 For a discussion of why the Court is apt to review cases involving challenges to con-
gressional spending, see Bagenstos, supra note 96, at 408–10.
205 Walsh, supra note 18.
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Department of Education would “fill in the gaps,” there would be no clear statement
rule violation. Yet, the unfunded mandates clause has left ambiguity that allows the
states to reasonably deduce multiple meanings, separate and distinct from any sug-
gestions made by the Secretary.  In this respect, the states cannot be said to have re-
ceived the Arlington standard of clear notice, nor can they be said to have knowingly
entered into the voluntary program.
The court in Pontiac considered Arlington to be a persuasive indication that if
a state is not placed on clear notice of the consequences of acceptance, congressional
intent is of no consequence.206  The fact that a court could reasonably interpret the
unfunded mandates clause to mean what the plaintiffs in Pontiac had argued is not as
important as the sheer volume of possible interpretations, some of which conflict. The
court, restating the Arlington concurrence, mentioned that “the ball is properly left in
[Congress’s] court.”207  In order for the law to conform to the clear notice requirement,
it need only be modified to remove the ambiguity discussed, or place states on notice
that the Secretary has authority to impose financial mandates.  Either a section con-
taining exceptions, similar to the aforementioned Perkins Act, or an outright removal
of the unfunded mandates clause would be sufficient.208  The Sixth Circuit has already
gone out of its way to note the importance of construing federal legislation “so as to
resolve ambiguous language in favor of the states.”209  There is no foreseeable reason
it would deviate from this determination should the argument be made once again.
Although all of the Pontiac litigation to date has addressed the sole issue of
whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim for which they may seek relief, the opinions
were able to discuss, in broad terms, the unfunded mandates clause.210  Consequently,
there exists a record that represents the many manners in which the clause may be
reasonably read.211  Courts should recognize this interpretive ambiguity and allow
states to bring constitutional challenges to NCLB under the auspices of the clear state-
ment rule.  Disallowing such challenges would either undercut the case law surround-
ing the Spending Clause, or deny that a court could infer that a reasonable reading
of the language supports the hypothesis that states need not comply with conditions
not fully funded by the federal government.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLITICAL PRACTICALITY
NCLB, once widely praised as a bipartisan achievement, has dwindled down to
become “the most negative brand in America.”212  In his first month as Secretary of
206 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir. 2008).
207 Id. at 272.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 188–201.
209 See Coleman v. Glynn, 983 F.2d 737, 737 (6th Cir. 1993) (Merritt, C.J., concurring).
210 See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 254; Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535-DT,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005).
211 See, e.g., Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 272.
212 Sam Dillon, Rename Law? No Wisecrack is Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009,
at A12 (quoting Rep. George Miller (D-CA)). Comedian Jay Leno stated that the law was
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Education, Arne Duncan stressed the need to reshape, or at least rename, the law.213 
A few were quick to quip that the law ought to be renamed “No Child Left Untested,”
or “No School Board Left Standing.”214  Many state and local officials expected that
the law would be reauthorized in 2007, but the negotiations reached a standstill. 
Those who believe that NCLB ought to be restructured are concerned about throw-
ing the baby out with the bathwater.  Regardless, the constitutional concerns require
Congress to review NCLB and amend it to comply with the clear statement rule. 
The states must be given the opportunity to knowingly and voluntarily consent to the
Title I funding terms and conditions.  One suggested new name for the law was most
on point, recommending NCLB be renamed the “Could We Start Again Please Act.”215
A. Recommendations for Reshaping NCLB
It is widely acknowledged that NCLB has two major problems, in addition to
the constitutional concerns of congressional vagueness, that require attention and
revision.216  First, the accountability issues are viewed by many as either too optimistic
or altogether misguided.217  It is quite clear that the AYP requirements, especially the
2014 deadline for one hundred percent academic proficiency, have placed an undue
burden on many states.218  Second, the program is viewed by many in the Senate as
being vastly under-funded.219  Both of these problems deserve and require swift reso-
lution for NCLB to be considered a successful program.  It has been suggested that
the Department of Education focus on measuring actual growth, and rewarding prog-
ress instead of punishing failure.220  Accountability in this manner may seem indirect,
but at the very least it would remove the failed policies of the past and the impend-
ing implosion that is destined to occur as we near 2014.  This system would also pro-
vide for a fairer application of AYP requirements, as schools will receive credit for
those cognizable groups making actual progress.221  In this scenario schools that make
such progress are not penalized, and states might not resort to redefining the level
of proficiency.222
so interconnected with President Bush’s low approval rating that “even the children left
behind are going, ‘You go ahead, we’re fine.’” Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 188–92.
217 See MANNA, supra note 13, at 125.
218 See Dillon, supra note 60.
219 David J. Hoff, Bush Presses NCLB Renewal on His Terms, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 16, 2008,
at 16, 18.
220 See JOHN E. CHUBB, LEARNING FROM NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: HOW AND WHY THE
NATION’S MOST IMPORTANT BUT CONTROVERSIAL EDUCATION LAW SHOULD BE RENEWED
26–31 (2009).
221 See id. at 29.
222 For a discussion of what states have been doing recently to lower the standard of profi-
ciency, see infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
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Yet even if incentives are modified in this manner, the unfunded mandates clause
ambiguities must be addressed in order for the legislation to be a constitutionally
valid exercise of the congressional spending power.  If NCLB is reauthorized in its
current form, challenges invoking the clear statement rule should be successful.223 
An outright removal of the unfunded mandates clause itself would remove the clear
statement rule dilemma.224  Though this removal would be sufficient to quash any
claims of ambiguity, it is certainly not necessary to assuage the current problems of
the unfunded mandates clause.  Another suggestion is to pass an amendment upon the
reauthorization of NCLB that would include a cost schedule for any possible man-
dates, relating to AYP calculations or otherwise.  Recall the UMRA goal, allowing for
federal legislation that “would force Congress to assess costs of new mandates and
take a separate vote when they impose large uncompensated costs.”225  Similar steps
to modify NCLB could adequately alleviate the ambiguity concerns.
UMRA mandates that committees considering legislation, and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), estimate the costs of any federal mandate on state or local gov-
ernments.226  Although, as it remains a voluntary government program, NCLB does
not fall within the confines of UMRA,227 the latter piece of legislation would serve
as a useful guideline.  Namely, should Congress expressly amend NCLB so as to fall
under the purview of the UMRA and its limitations, all federal mandates on the states
would require CBO review.228  UMRA states that “any mandate . . . cost[ing] state
or local governments more than $50 million a year . . . would be subject to a point
of order during debate.”229  This can lead to reconsideration and indirect defeats to
proposed expenditures.230  More importantly, however, the process would become
transparent to the states, such that their consent to the program could be construed
as both voluntary and knowing.231  The UMRA guidelines, if applied in this context,
223 Indeed, they may very well be successful in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bagenstos,
supra note 96, at 355.
224 As of this publication, there has not been any prominent litigation suggesting that other
language contained in NCLB violates the constitutional “clear statement rule.”
225 Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Limit Unfunded Mandates, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1995,
at A1; see also supra notes 173–78 and accompanying text.
226 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 174, at 3.
227 David S. Broder, Those Unfunded Mandates, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A25.
228 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 174, at 3.
229 Broder, supra note 227; see 2 U.S.C. § 658d (2006).
230 Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism?: The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1117–18 (1997) (commenting that
“legislation [lacking] a cost estimate or that includes certain unfunded intergovernmental man-
dates is out of order, and any member of Congress can object to its consideration. Only if the
objection is waived by a simple majority can the chamber continue to debate the bill.”).
231 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
(“States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are ‘unaware’ or which they are
‘unable to ascertain.’”(quoting Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981))).
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would adequately place the states on notice as to both the process and potential for
increased responsibility.
Further, implementing a cost schedule whereby Congress would be required to
authorize any federal mandate compelling a state to spend its own money, beyond
a certain statutory level, would allow for federal mandates while simultaneously
removing the clear statement rule dilemma.  It would add a significant amount of
clarity to the law, which in turn would allow the states to make informed decisions. 
In addition, were Congress to create a commission akin to the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, which studies the costs and benefits of each man-
date as per the UMRA requirements,232 still more information will be available to
the states.233  Though Congress could ignore the commission’s recommendation and
vote to sustain the unfunded expenditure, the states would still have a plethora of
legislative history detailing the ultimate decision with respect to each mandate.
B. Potential Changes and Political Practicality of NCLB Reauthorization
Not only is NCLB unclear, it is also unsustainable.  The AYP compliance require-
ments, coupled with the under-funding in Title I, have placed considerable fiscal pres-
sure on many states—some of which are on the brink of bankruptcy.234  California
recently sought a taxpayer bailout, citing federal mandates as a factor in the decision.235 
Having gambled on a 2007 reauthorization and subsequent change in NCLB condi-
tions,236 states are now doing whatever they can to comply with the law, including
lowering standards.237  Fifteen states have lowered one or more testing standards, and
as a result have changed what is required of the local school districts in order to achieve
the requisite AYP.238  States can do this quite easily as the NCLB requires only that
students be academically “proficient” by the 2014 deadline, a term the law neglects
to define.239
232 See 2 U.S.C. § 1551 (2006).
233 Such information would be contained in the commission reports, as well as press
releases.
234 California is one such example. See Stu Woo & Jim Carlton, California Requests
Billions From U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A3 (“Arnold Schwarzenegger asked for
$6.9 billion in federal funds in his state-budget proposal Friday and warned that state health
and welfare programs would be threatened without the emergency help.”).
235 Id. (“Federal mandates . . . ‘force [California] to spend money that we do not have.’”
(quoting Gov. Schwarzenegger)).
236 See supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text.
237 Dillon, supra note 68 (reviewing a study published by the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l
Center for Education Statistics, supra note 30).
238 Id. (“The 15 states that lowered one or more standards were Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.”).
239 Rigdon, supra note 132.
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During the 2008 presidential election, little was mentioned regarding educa-
tional policy or NCLB, particularly by President Obama.240  This was likely a tactical
campaign decision.  According to a recent poll, over two-thirds of Americans believe
that the law should be overhauled in some way, and twenty-two percent believe the
law is hurting public education.241  The spike in popular opinion surrounding a
proactive federal education policy is unlikely to subside in the near future,242 yet most
Americans appear to be looking for real reform.  Indeed, at one point during his cam-
paign President Obama called “No Child Left Behind ‘one of the emptiest slogans
in the history of politics’ and . . . [said that] it needs more funding.”243  Thankfully,
it received some more funding as a result of the economic stimulus package enacted
last February.244
The law itself grants power to the administration in deciding whether to implement
any administrative changes.245  In this respect, the current Secretary of Education,
Arne Duncan, enjoys significant discretion in terms of accountability overhauls. 
Both with the $4 billion “Race to the Top Fund” and his recent comments, it appears
that Secretary Duncan plans to move the federal policy more in line with the above-
mentioned suggestion of financial incentives.246  The administration also has suggested
that it will seek to define proficiency by using “growth models, in which schools get
credit for improving the progress of individual students.”247  In doing so, the admin-
istration has recommended that Congress adopt new standards using language such
as “college- and career-ready.”248 Indeed, the President’s 2011 budget request pro-
posed an overhaul of the AYP system itself.249  Any new reauthorization of NCLB
must provide added clarity, and the new administration seems poised to provide some. 
Yet, considering the mid-term elections that will be held this November and the
240 Maria Glod, In Rush to White House, ‘No Child’ Is Left Behind; Obama, McCain Reveal
Little on Updates for Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A4.
241 Id.
242 MANNA, supra note 13, at 4 fig.1.1 (displaying the general trend of public demand for
federal education policy).
243 Glod, supra note 240.
244 Alyson Klein, Duncan Aims to Make Incentives Key Element of ESEA; Education
Secretary Weighs Priorities for Law’s Renewal, EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 9, 2009, at 1.
245 Id.
246 Id. His department is also seeking “to build on the emphasis on teacher quality, data,
standards, and support of low-performing schools.” Id.
247 Id.; see also Nick Anderson, Obama Would Scrap ‘No Child’ Standard, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2010, at A11 (stating that the President’s proposed 2011 budget would require any
reauthorization of NCLB to “replace [the AYP model] with a broader picture of school
performance that looks at student growth and school progress”).
248 Sam Dillon, Obama to Propose New Reading and Math Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2010, at A13.
249 See id.; Anderson, supra note 247.
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current agenda of Congress,250 any such reauthorization would be difficult to accom-
plish this year.
CONCLUSION
The many interpretations discussed in the Pontiac opinions indicate that the
unfunded mandates clause is ambiguous at best, and coercive at worst.251  The clear
statement rule requires congressional linguistic precision, at least to the point where
a court could not determine that a reasonable interpretation of such language would
lead to ambiguity.252  One commentator is steadfast in his prediction that the Supreme
Court, now more than ever, is willing to tackle issues and complaints related to
Congress’s violation of the Spending Clause.253  He suggests that the Court, quite
possibly for ideological reasons, will curtail conditional spending by using doctrines
such as the clear statement rule.254  As a result, if the executive or legislative branches
remain unwilling to remedy these state concerns regarding NCLB’s language, and
reauthorize it in its current form, eventually the judicial branch will strike down the
law relying on the unfunded mandates clause.
Despite the significant practical and constitutional problems with NCLB, neither
Congress nor the Department of Education has acted in a way that would alleviate
these concerns.  Before leaving office, Secretary Spellings released a “Blueprint for
Strengthening” NCLB.255  In it, the Department sought to increase “meaningful flexi-
bility to states and districts” with respect to the provisions regarding Title I funding.256 
The previous administration’s willingness and complicity with state AYP recalculation
requests, coupled with its inflexibility with regard to the 2014 proficiency deadline,
has only compounded the predicament.  States procrastinating with their achievement
rates are now facing alarmingly heightened AYP requirements that are next to impos-
sible to attain.257  In order for there to be any kind of success with a new NCLB law,
the 2014 deadline will inevitably be forced to a much later date, if it even survives
reauthorization.  The alternative, a lower than one hundred percent proficiency
250 Gerald F. Seib, In 2010, Economy Again to Crowd Domestic Stage—Deep Federal
Deficit Levels Will Rein in Policy Makers’ Ambitions—and Could Reshape Political Landscape
in November, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2010, at A2.
251 See supra Part III.B.
252 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
253 See Bagenstos, supra note 96, at 350.
254 Id. at 350–51 (stating that “it is wrong to expect the Roberts Court to be so charitable
about Congress’s exercise of the spending power”).
255 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BUILDING ON RESULTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR STRENGTHENING THE
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 3–15 (2007), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/
nclb/buildingonresults.pdf.
256 Id. at 8.
257 See Dillon, supra note 60.
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requirement, although realistic, would do away with the original intention of the
proposal by former President George W. Bush back in 2001.258
Although he surely has not acted as quickly as his predecessor,259 President
Obama and his administration are, and will continue to be, the most influential players
in NCLB restructuring.  Because it has already been made clear by leaders in both the
Senate and the House that bolstering the economy and healthcare reform will be the
primary objectives in 2010,260 the only means by which states may seek funds despite
non-compliance might very well be through the Secretary of Education’s permissible
dispensations.  By allowing some to reasonably assume that certain NCLB condi-
tions would be fully funded by the federal government, the unfunded mandates clause
has created ambiguity indicating that Congress has overstepped its Spending Clause
boundaries.  Congress has heretofore displayed its unwillingness to change the law,
but even were it to reauthorize NCLB according to the President’s 2011 budget pro-
posal, the constitutional problem would remain.  Consequently, the courts must resolve
this dilemma by applying the clear statement rule and striking down the unfunded
mandates clause and NCLB.
258 See MYCOFF & PIKA, supra note 7, at 33–36.
259 See id. at 33.
260 See Seib, supra note 250; Healthcare, Economy, Security on Obama’s 2010 Agenda,
REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6033
BD20100104.
